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Abstract. In this paper we propose a new graphic symmetrical cryp-
tosystem in order to encrypt a colored image defined by pixels and by
any number of colors. This cryptosystem is based on a reversible bidi-
mensional cellular automaton and uses a pseudorandom bit generator.
As the key of the cryptosystem is the seed of the pseudorandom bit
generator, the latter has to be cryptographically secure. Moreover, the
recovered image from the ciphered image has not loss of resolution and
the ratio between the ciphered image and the original one, i.e., the factor
expansion of the cryptosystem, is 1.
1 Introduction
As it is known, the goal of cryptography is to assure the secrecy and confidential-
ity of communications between two or more users, who use an insecure channel
([9], [10]). Opposite, the goal of cryptanalysis is to break the security and privacy
of these communications. Here, we are interested in a special class of messages:
colored images.
We propose to use cellular automata of dimension 2 and pseudorandom bit
generators as a graphic symmetrical cryptosystem, that is, as a symmetrical
cryptosystem to encrypt colored images. The proposed protocol begins with a
message (the plaintext), uses an algorithm (based on a cellular automaton of
dimension 2 and a pseudorandom bit generator), and ends with an encrypted
message (the ciphertext). We wish that both messages, the plaintext and the
ciphertext, belong to the set of colored images of the same size, i.e., the cipher-
image will be defined by the same number of pixels than the plainimage. In
this way, several applications to watermarking, steganography and subliminal
cryptography, can be derived.
To date, there are several proposals for using images in cryptography. Some of
them are based on dynamical systems ([6], [7]), but these proposals are difficult
to implement in practice due to the difference between the chaotic arithmetic
defined by the dynamical systems and the discrete arithmetic of the comput-
ers. Other proposals for encrypting images are based on the use of compression
methods in an iterated way ([4], [5]). In these cases, the problem is that the
recovered image has less definition than the original one.
The foremost use of images in cryptography is done by means of the visual
cryptography ([12], [15]). It is based on visual threshold schemes t of n, that
is, the original image is divided in n shades. Each of them is photocopied in a
transparency and then, the original image is recovered by superimposing any
t transparencies, but no less. Moreover, no cryptographic protocol is used to
recover it. Nevertheless, the recovered image also has less definition than the
original one.
There are some applications of the previous protocols. Visual authentication
and identification methods are proposed in [11]; the identification of documents
and photograph signatures are presented in [1] and [13]; and visual secret sharing
schemes for developing a method for intellectual property protection of grey level
images in [3].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Cellular automata are briefly
recalled in §2, and the main properties of pseudorandom bit generators are pre-
sented in §3. In §4 the proposal of a new graphic cryptosystem is presented, and
finally, the conclusions are summarized in §5.
2 Cellular automata
A 2-dimensional finite cellular automaton, (CA for short), A= (L, S, V, f) ([14]),
is a 4-uplet, where L is the cellular space formed by a 2-dimensional array of
size r × s of identical objects, called cells. Each cell is denoted by 〈i, j〉, with
0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, and 0 ≤ j ≤ s − 1. We denote by S the finite set of all possible
values of the cells which is called the state set. As the state set is finite, we take
|S| = k. Let V ⊂ ZZ2 be a finite ordered subset, called the set of indices of L,
then for every cell 〈i, j〉 ∈ L, its neighborhood, V〈i,j〉 is an ordered set of n cells
defined as follows:
V〈i,j〉 = {〈i + α, j + β〉 :∀ (α, β) ∈ V } ⊂ L. (1)
Moreover, the local transition function f : Sn → S is a function which determines
the evolution of the CA throughout the time, i.e., the changes of the states of
every cell taking the states of its neighbors into account. Finally, as the CA
considered are finite, we take periodic boundary conditions of the form:
a
(t)
ij = a
(t)
kl ⇔ i ≡ k (mod r) and j ≡ l (mod s), (2)
where a
(t)
ij ∈ S stands for the state of the cell 〈i, j〉 at time t. Hence, the cellular
space can be supposed as a 2-dimensional toroidal array. The matrix
C(t) =
(
a
(t)
ij
)
, 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ s− 1, (3)
is called the configuration of A at time t. In particular, C (0) is called the initial
configuration of the CA. Hence, the evolution of A is the sequence
(
C(0), C(1), C(2), . . .
)
.
A cellular automaton is reversible (RCA for short) if there exists another
CA, called its inverse, that computes the inverse evolution of A.
3 Pseudorandom bit generators
As is well known, a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) is a deterministic
algorithm which, given a truly random bit sequence of length l, outputs a binary
sequence of length g  l, which appears to be random. The input to the PRBG
is called the seed, whereas the output is called a pseudorandom bit sequence.
They are very used in cryptography, for example, to encrypt a plaintext by using
a stream cipher, where the secret key is the seed. Hence, good random properties
of the generator are convenient to prevent statistical attacks; but moreover, it is
necessary that the generator must be cryptographically secure (CSPRBG). The
security, in this sense, means that the probability that an algorithm can produce
the next bit of a given sequence in a polynomial time, is negligible.
In particular, the BBS generator (see [2]) is defined by iterating the function
x2 (mod n) on the set of the quadratic residues of integers modulo n, where n
is a Blum integer, i.e., n = p · q, where p and q are very large prime numbers,
both congruent to 3 modulo 4. That is, starting from a seed x0, and iterating
xi+1 ≡ x
2
i (mod n), one obtains a binary sequence bi = parity(xi). This PRBS
is a CSPRBG under the assumption that the integer factorization is intractable.
The length of the orbits of the BBS generator were characterized in [8], hence the
BBS generator is a good option to be used in the graphic cryptosystem proposed
below.
4 The graphic cryptosystem
In this section we propose a graphic symmetrical cryptosystem in order to en-
crypt a colored image. This cryptosystem is based on a reversible 2-dimensional
CA and uses a cryptographically secure PRBG.
Let I be a colored image defined by r × s pixels, Pij , where the pixels are
denoted by Pij = (p
1
ij , p
2
ij , . . . , p
24
ij ), with p
n
ij ∈ ZZ2, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ s,
1 ≤ n ≤ 24, and c colors, with 2 ≤ c ≤ 224. If Pij is in the m-th position from
the left top corner of the image, then m = (i− 1)s + j, with 1 ≤ m ≤ r × s.
4.1 Key generation
The key of the graphic cryptosystem is the key used for the CSPRBG to generate
the pseudorandom bit sequence. Then, the security of the proposed cryptosystem
is guaranteed by the security of the PRBG. This is the reason why a CSPRBG
is used. Hence, to break this graphic cryptosystem it is necessary to determine
the keys used by the pseudorandom bit generator. In the suggested generator
(the BBS generator), this means to determine the prime numbers p and q, or
the modulus n = p · q, and to factorize it. Moreover, the session key k0 is also
necessary. But, to date this problem is infeasible computationally.
In our practical implementation we use the BBS pseudorandom generator.
Hence, the key is the couple (n,K), where the number n = p · q is the product
of two large primes numbers, each of them congruent to 3 modulo 4; and K is
the seed used to generate the bit sequence (the session key). The modulo n is a
long-term key, whereas the seed, i.e., K is a short-term key, that is, it must be
changed for each session.
We denote by B = (B1, B2, . . . , Br×s) the bit pseudorandom sequence of
length r × s × 24 generated by the CSPRBG from the key K, where Bm =
(bm1, bm2, . . . , bm24), and bmn ∈ ZZ2.
4.2 Encryption
To construct the encryption protocol, we consider the RCA A= (L, S, V, f) de-
fined by:
(i) The cellular space, L, is a rectangular array of size r× s, i.e., L is the set of
r × s pixels.
(ii) The state set is defined by S = ZZ2×
(24. . . ×ZZ2, with |S| = 2
24; hence, each
color of the image I can be identified with an element in S. We denote by
xm = (um1, . . . , um24) an element of S, where umn ∈ ZZ2, 1 ≤ n ≤ 24.
(iii) The set of indices, V , is selected in a public way, such that |V | = 24. For
example, if we consider the square of size 5× 5 around the cell 〈i, j〉, except
the cell itself, the set of indices is
V = {(−2,−2), . . . , (−2, 2), . . . , (0,−1), (0, 1), . . . , (2,−2), . . . , (2, 2)}, (4)
and the neighborhood, V〈i,j〉, can be viewed as follows:
• • • • •
• • • • •
• • ◦ • •
• • • • •
• • • • •
This set can be represented by two variables h and w, V〈i,j〉 = {(i+h, j+w)},
where:
h = b(n− 1)/5c − 2, w = (n− 1) (mod 5)− 2, 1 ≤ n ≤ 12, (5)
h = bn/5c − 2, w = n (mod 5)− 2, 13 ≤ n ≤ 24. (6)
(iv) To determine the encrypted pixel of Pij , Qij , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, the 24
pixels of the neighbourhood of Pij , V〈i,j〉: Pi−2,j−2, . . . , Pi−2,j+2, . . . , Pi,j−1,
Pi,j+1, . . . , Pi+2,j+2, are taken, and the transition function f : S
24 → S is
applied to them as follows:
Pij → Qij : f (Pi−2,j−2, Pi−2,j−1, . . . , Pi+2,j+2)
= Bm ⊕ (pi1 (Pi−2,j−2) , pi2 (Pi−2,j−1) , . . . , pi24 (Pi+2,j+2))
= (bm1, bm2, . . . , bm24)⊕
(
p1i−2,j−2, p
2
i−2,j−1, . . . , p
24
i+2,j+2
)
=
(
bm1 ⊕ p
1
i−2,j−2, bm2 ⊕ p
2
i−2,j−1, . . . , bm24 ⊕ p
24
i+2,j+2
)
=
(
q1ij , q
2
ij , . . . , q
24
ij
)
= Qij ,
that is, qnij = bmn ⊕ p
n
i+h,j+w; m denotes the position of the pixel Pij , i.e.,
m = (i − 1)s + j, Bm is the m-th component of the bit sequence B, the
operation ⊕ is the XOR-operation, pin : S → ZZ
(n)
2 is the projection onto
the n-th component, and the boundary conditions are periodic conditions.
The cipherimage, C, is obtained by applying only once the above transition
function to each pixel of the plainimage I. In this way, the cipherimage is defined
by r×s pixels and d colors, with 2 ≤ d ≤ 224. Moreover the expansion factor for
this cryptosystem is 1, i.e., the ratio between the cipherimage and the plainimage
is 1. This cryptosystem considers the original image as the initial configuration
of the CA, and the ciphered image as the configuration of the CA at time t = 1.
It is not necessary to iterate the CA more than once since the security of the
cryptosystem is not increased in other case.
4.3 Decryption
For the decryption protocol, the receiver considers the inverse CA of A, that is,
A
−1 = (L, S,W, g). The cellular space L and the state set S of A−1 are the same
that for A. The set of indices of A−1 is W = −V , i.e., W is the same set of
indices of A, but they are taken in their inverse order. Then, the neighbourhood
of the pixel 〈i, j〉 is:
W = {(2, 2), . . . , (2,−2), . . . , (0, 1), (0,−1), . . . , (−2, 2), . . . , (−2,−2)}. (7)
Moreover, as in the previous case, the neighbourhood of the cell 〈k, l〉, W〈k,l〉,
can be codified by the same two variables h and w: W〈k,l〉 = {(k − h, l − w)}.
The transition function g : S24 → S to decrypt a pixel is defined in the
following way:
Qkl → Rkl : g (Qk+2,l+2, Qk+2,l+1, . . . , Qk−2,l−2)
= B′t ⊕ (pi1 (Qk+2,l+2) , pi2 (Qk+2,l+1) , . . . , pi24 (Qk−2,l−2))
= (b′t1, b
′
t2, . . . , b
′
t24)⊕
(
q1k+2,l+2, q
2
k+2,l+1, . . . , q
24
k−2,l−2
)
=
(
b′t1 ⊕ q
1
k+2,l+2, b
′
t2 ⊕ q
2
k+2,l+1, . . . , b
′
t24 ⊕ q
24
k−2,l−2
)
=
(
b′t1 ⊕ bm1 ⊕ p
1
k,l, b
′
t2 ⊕ bm2 ⊕ p
2
k,l, . . . , b
′
t24 ⊕ bm24 ⊕ p
24
k,l
)
=
(
p1kl, p
2
kl, . . . , p
24
kl
)
= Pkl,
where rnkl = b
′
tn ⊕ q
n
k−h,l−w = p
n
kl; t denotes the position of Qk−h,l−w, i.e.,
t = (k − 1 − h)s + l − w, and hence b′t,n = b(k−1−h)s+l−w,n, pin : S → ZZ
2(n)
is the projection onto the n-th component, the symbol ⊕ stands for the XOR-
operation, and the contour conditions are periodic conditions.
Hence, to recover the t-th decrypted pixel, Pkl, one has to apply the transi-
tion function g to its corresponding encrypted pixel, Qkl. The plainimage, I, is
recovered by applying once the transition function to each pixel of the cipher-
image C. The plainimage I is identical to the original one (pixel by pixel), that
is, the recovered image has no loss of resolution.
4.4 Example
In this subsection we present an example of a colored plainimage (“Self-Portrait”
by Tamara de Lempicka) and its corresponding cipherimage. Both images are
defined by 602× 800 pixels, and they are shown reduced in Fig. 1. The number
of colors of the first image is 85803, whereas the second one has 474750 colors.
For this example we have used a key with artificially small parameters. The
bitlength of the prime numbers are 64, hence the bitlength of the modulus n is
128. The values of the modulus and the key are, respectively:
n = p · q = 609490657811550215868356152313472597421, (8)
K = 430146343670092314107950454676296640957. (9)
Fig. 1. Example of a plainimage and its cipherimage
5 Conclusions
A new graphic symmetrical cryptosystem is presented in order to encrypt a col-
ored image defined by pixels and by any number of colors. This cryptosystem is
based on a reversible bidimensional cellular automaton and uses a cryptograph-
ically secure pseudorandom bit generator. The key of the cryptosystem is the
same that for the CSPRBG and the session key is the seed used to generate the
pseudorandom bit sequence. Moreover, the decrypted image is identical to the
original one, i.e., no loss of resolution takes place.
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